The European Union (EU) project has endured over sixty years[1]. Though initially its purpose was economic cooperation, its creators aspired to some form of future political integration too[2]. Yet the present political integration is rather loose, and if it is to mature and to evolve into a concrete entity, it must overcome one obstacle: the lack of a (common political) identity, or the impossibility to agree on what that identity may be. Two main positions - hereafter called 'nationalist' and 'cosmopolitanist', respectively - have tried to offer a possible solution.
The nationalist position places identity in some kind of normative content, which is often referred to as 'culture'[3]. Applied to the EU, the 'European culture' would distinguish Europeans from other peoples. The only problem would be to specify what that national culture might consist of. The future political EU entity would have to be something like a very big nation-State. In the past two centuries, countries were born out of specific cultural elements pertaining to the character of their people: Italians, French, and Germans, became nations - Italy, France, Germany -. And so, growing awareness of a common identity - based on culture - among the Europeans, could give place to their common nation - 'Europe' - with the political configuration of a State.
The cosmopolitanist position, in contrast, sees identity as a set of formal, general principles of life together (typically a Constitution) that allows political life to flow regardless of differences in - often conflicting - 'world views' that subsist within a State. Therefore the EU should have a multinational - rather than national - identity. To speak of identity in terms of ‘European people’ as a national group, would not make sense. The nation-States from the XIX and XX century actually would not have been 'naturally born', but to a certain extent, artificially created, upon certain elements that were presented as proof of each nation's 'uniqueness' and greatness. This construction would have often resulted in nationalism, which would have motivated a number of destructive wars - the most devastating being World War I and II. So political identity based on a national culture could be problematic for an integrated EU in the future. Instead, a State with a 'post (or 'multi)-national' identity should be promoted. All views should be included and the political identity should be founded in a common set of formal principles. The only problem would be to define them and integrate them.
The present essay seeks to explore these ideas at an introductory level, with the purpose of developing them with more detail in a further research project (a PhD thesis). The work is divided in five parts: (1) identity as an essential concept for a feasible integration of the European Union (‘EU’); (2) the nationalist approach and (3) its shortcomings; (4) an alternative, ‘cosmopolitan’ view, as well as (5) its possible downsides in view of the EU reality. After the Conclusion, in which both positions are evaluated, an Excursus touches the pertinence of this research for Australia.
1. Identity and the problem of EU political integration
The concept of 'identity' has been around in philosophy for more than twenty four centuries, at least since Aristotle[4]. It can be approached from the point of view of philosophy, psychology, sociology and mathematics[5], among others.
In political philosophy, 'identity' can refer to the 'glue' that binds together the members of a State. It definitely has to do with collective and social integration, a ‘sense of belonging’ that influences the level of social cohesion of a political community[6]. According to Furio Cerutti[7], political identity may have been founded in the past on culture (ethnic, religious, linguistic values), but it does not need to. Essentially, it would consist, in the first place, of an awareness of citizenship around a set of core principles that everybody (in a political entity) recognises as their own, and that are usually expressed in a Constitution.
Now if the EU already exists, why would it be a problem to clarify its (political) identity? At least for two reasons:
Ad intra, the EU clearly still doesn't have a defined and strong common awareness as a political entity. The cases of votes against the EU project have not been infrequent: Danish, French, Dutch, Irish, British, Swiss and Norwegian, all of them citizens of countries which can with no doubt be considered 'European', have at some point voted negatively in against important treaties, opted out of key initiatives – like the euro - or not even wanted to join the EU[8]. In such occasions, they have perceived the EU as somewhat external, threatening - 'not them', in terms of their national identity. Besides, the EU has become an entity of 27 national states, 4.2 million square kilometres of territory, and nearly 500 million inhabitants. It possesses a potential economic, political and social clout in the world scene. Yet such power will only be actualised depending on the EU's possibility to act as a single entity. The EU project does not stop in the realisation of a common market, not even in the achievement of a single currency. It intends to pursue ‘an ever closer union'[9] which entails elements like common laws, a foreign affair policy and a coordinated defence scheme. But as long as a stronger political identity is not found (or built), the project will not develop.
Ad extra, 'EU' is different from 'Europe'. The Council of Europe, for example, has 47 member states and 800 million people[10]. It is evident that the expansion of the EU has not finished yet. Now, for some reason, it might sound more natural to think that Norway or Switzerland, if they applied, could be easily admitted to the EU. Would applications from, say, Georgia or Armenia go as fast? If not, Why? Countries like Denmark, The Netherlands, Germany and France have expressed strong reserves about the possible acceptance of Turkey as a member. In other words, since Europe is not a territory clearly defined in absolute terms (Is Russia 'part of' Europe?, Is Iran in Asia or in Europe?)[11], and it is made of a diversity of language, ethnic, religious and national groups (including 'nations without a State', like Catalonia or Scotland[12]), which criteria would be acceptable in order to determine 'europeanness' - that distinctive character that could make a group part of Europe (as opposed to, say, Asia or Africa)? The political identity of Europe needs to be defined in order to set standards – and limits - for further enlargements.
2. 'Europeanness', or national culture as the source of identity in Europe
One possible answer to the problem of identity is that it can be found in national culture. ‘Culture’ is understood here in a very broad sense. It is based on certain content. That content can be language, history, geography, literature, religion, art, philosophy (even cuisine), or several aspects together, that configure a nation. An outstanding upholder of this view is Václav Havel, who describes Europe as a community of destiny, of values, life and responsibility. He has proposed a ‘Charter of European Identity’, and promotes an identity that at a European level can reproduce an equivalent national-like patriotism[13].
For Schmale[14], European identity could be traced back to the cultural heritage from Greece, Rome, Christianity and the Enlightenment. It would have changed with time. In the early modern period (XV Century, for him) the European identity would have been given by Christianity, since Europe was Christendom. Later on, with the Enlightenment, the European identity would have had to lay on the concept of 'national culture'. Today, identity would have to do with coherence in the sense of a cultural place in which diversity of world views is received and harmonised. Culture in the new perspective would be anything that creates and gives sense and meaning, and the goals of certain human communities. Whereas for Anthony Giddens, European identity is based on the values contained in the 'European social model'[15], that which is specifically European, Schmale says, is to accept diversity. The EU would become then a framework whose unity consists of a harmonious praxis and rational decision making which allows the expression of diversity, of different converging human groups. This view in its final conclusions comes close to the second position analysed in this essay[16], but does not detach itself from the nationalist perspective[17].
3. Shortcomings of identity based on national culture
Some difficulties arise from the national culture view of European identity, when it comes to promoting a successful EU political integration. There are important differences between the ways in which Europe is conceived by two institutions that present themselves as European: the EU[18] and the Council of Europe[19]. As said in the precedent section, one is supposed to represent 500 million people and the other 800 million. The first one reaches as far as what is commonly known as ‘Eastern Europe’[20] and the other seems to extend to parts of what could be considered either Europe or Asia[21]. One includes – up to now at least - only countries with a Christian tradition, the other has some nations with a strong Muslim background (like Bosnia-Herzegovina or Albania).
Three strong components of a ‘national culture’-based European identity are next commented, to illustrate why they could be problematic to define Europe: geography, the ethno-linguistic character, and religion.
Geographically Europe has blurred limits[22] to the East. Is Azerbaijan part of Europe or Asia? Why is not Iran - right next to Azerbaijan and Turkey - Europe? If a Russian living in the city of Bryansk, moved for work to Krasnoyarsk, would she turn from European into Asian? What is the relation of Libya, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia or Egypt with Europe[23]? Is Greenland out of Europe? Though there are some criteria widely accepted for some of Europe’s boundaries (the Ural Mountains in the North East, the Atlantic Ocean to the West), others are not that clear and their conventional character leaves a place for contest and discussion.
The ethno-linguistic component has been listed as another element of common identity for Europeans. At a simple grasp, Europe can be encircled within three main subgroups, all of them belonging to the Indo-European family: Slavic, Latin and Germanic[24]. Yet that only explains 85% of the existing ethno-linguistic groups. A non-negligible part[25] of ‘the rest’ includes, within the Indo-European branch, the Celtic, Greek, Albanian, Indo-Arian (Roma people), Baltic, Armenian and Iranian. But that is not all. Six more groups, altogether different from the Indo-European, have to be counted as also (at least partially) European: Turkic, Finno-Ugric, Caucasian, Basque, Semitic and Mongolic[26]. From the point of view of ethnic-linguistic background, the Iranians would be as European as the Kurds[27], the Turks and the Azerbaijanies. The ethno-linguistic perspective can find many more problems. For example could not Australia or Argentina (both 90% European from the ethnic-linguistic perspective) be considered parts of Europe on these grounds?
Arguably, another possible source of national culture identity could be religion. Europe and Christendom were almost the same thing for hundreds of years, and Christianity was an important constituent in the formation of a ‘Western’ (i.e. European[28]) civilisation, at least from the IV century on[29]. After all, Orthodox, Protestants and Catholics account for around three quarters of Europe’s population[30], and historically Europe was the centre of a significant evangelisation process towards Africa, America, Asia and Oceania[31]. Yet the situation is not as simple, especially having in mind the goal of a deeper political integration for the EU (and its further expansion). Many Europeans declare to have no religious belief[32]. Equally important, the number of Muslims in Europe has grown well above the 50 million (approximately 6% of Europeans)[33], while Jews reach around 2 million (0.3%) and Buddhists 3 million (or 0.4%)[34]. Some countries, considered in Europe by the Council of Europe, have large percentages of Muslim populations, like Turkey (99%), Azerbaijan (93%), Albania (75%), Bosnia-Herzegovina (40%), or Russia (18%)[35]. Therefore, though religion may help to explain part of what has been the European identity in the past and even in the present, it can not provide the basis for an EU’s future political integration[36]. No common identity can be laid on the grounds of a single religion.
Some negative consequences of cultural nationalism became all too evident during the XX century. Nationalism (typically taken to the extreme in the fascist States under leaders like Mussolini and Hitler) carried people of one region, having one language, history, literature, philosophy, and so on, to think that they were better than others and even that certain groups deserved extermination altogether. But the two big XX century wars were not the only ones caused by nationalism. Cultural nationalism may have been as well at the base of strong colonial boosts[37], which brought to the colonies sometimes good and sometimes not as good thinks from Europe. Though the colonialists’ drive may have been in many cases pure ambition for wealth or power, it was often motivated on a genuine belief that they had an obligation to impose their language, religion, legal systems, and so on[38] in order to ‘civilise’ the new found territories. A nationalistic approach to the EU’s integration might inspire new forms of colonialism in the future.
4. Identity based on postnational cosmopolitanism
It is obvious, from the previous analysis, that to define an identity in nationalist terms - and as distinctively ‘European’ - can be, at least, problematic. So the question of finding an identity for the EU’s political integration may as well be approached from an altogether different perspective. A number of authors[39] have shifted attention from the discussion about the content of that identity - its national materiality - to its form or framework, in order to include any or all of the different identities and worldviews that come from them. This perspective is called at times ‘post-nationalism’, ‘constitutional patriotism’ or ‘cosmopolitanism’. Hereafter the last name is used because it seems to express the concept in a better way.
Identity can not only be based in a particular cultural, social, religious, linguistic context, but alternatively, in a common formal, minimal framework like tolerance, deliberative democracy and on an underlying 'cosmopolitanism' correspondent to a 'post-national' situation. According to the thinkers that maintain this view, a political evolution would be giving way from the nation-State of the XIX and XX centuries, to the 'post-national' State, built not on contents extracted from particular ethno-linguistic groups, religious traditions or geographical communities, but on a formal and inclusive set of rules and agreements under which the State can work and include any range of content groups and traditions, as long as they accept to live under that State and abide by its basic rules (for example its political Constitution).
The process by which the European nations emerged in the Modern Age would not have been natural, but artificially created (at least in part). Such construction would have included more or less real 'national heroes', a particular reading of history, even an ad hoc literature (and other forms of expression, including philosophy) that showed the high origins and unique call of a particular nation[40]. The cosmopolitanist claim is that, in the same way that national States were built artificially on a ‘national culture’, so new political entities could be built based on ‘post-national’ or cosmopolitan values.
By definition, a ‘cosmopolitan’ identity can not be exclusively ‘European’. Thus, the EU would only be the first case of this new postnational sort of State. It could be applied to other regions of the planet, and eventually lead to a new planetary postnational order, a global democracy[41], where the weight of nations and the power politics (or 'realism') counted less, and dialog and transnational cooperation more, towards a better world society.
A cosmopolitan Europe would open the door for a State in which many nationalities and cultures or 'worldviews' could live together in harmony, having in common a set of civic principles accepted by all. The cultural contents would not be lost, but included and appreciated and, inasmuch as possible, integrated into the State. When two or more cultural positions were in conflict with each other, their members should be able to translate their demands in a language understandable to everyone (also those outside their cultural group), make their case, and be ready to reach an agreement following the rules of the basic principles valid for everybody. The postnational character of this position would not mean the end of nationalities, but the end of nationality as the source of the State's political identity.
How might such identity be construed? The international treaties between European nations could serve as grounds for a ‘Charter’ or basic law of this new, postnational State. The civic political identity would derive from a process in which a discussion in a pan-European public sphere, parting from the Charter, could develop into a Constitution. Existing European political parties could promote this process in their countries of origin, and from there a European civic society with interest groups, non-governmental organisations, and citizens’ movements[42] could develop a common civic (cosmopolitan) identity[43].
Some advantages of a cosmopolitan order could be: the existence of a common arena where different world-views are discussed; the possibility of harmonisation among different religious groups which might otherwise opt for violence; the conservation of endangered ethno-linguistic minorities; and a more inclusive atmosphere that might result in the solution of conflicts and the preservation of peace, justice and prosperity at a global stage.
5. Obstacles to a cosmopolitan identity for Europe
But there are downsides as well: the possible vagueness of the formal framework for ‘civic identity’; the risk that among people with no historic, ethno-linguistic or religious similarities, solidarity and other elements, essential for the performance of any political entity, might not spontaneously flourish; the argument that when the economic and political situations are peaceful and prosperous, 'cosmopolitanism' may flourish, but as soon as a crisis arose, cultural nationalism would take over again, and result in 'clash of civilisations'-style disputes, as perceived by authors like Huntinghton[44].
Another objection (raised, for example, by Giddens[45] to Habermas) is that the cosmopolitan identity could not be coherently restricted to Europe (or the EU). In other words, Europe cannot define its uniqueness from any other region in terms of being the inclusive, difference- harmonising, society. The Middle East, Central America or sub-Saharan Africa might achieve these goals themselves and have to be called ‘European’ (cosmopolitan) as well. A concept like that would miss the goal of providing some sense and content to the term ‘European identity’. Therefore, choosing a cosmopolitan identity would imply the renounce to find a European one. But this is not necessarily an undesirable situation, as shall be seen in the conclusion.
A final critique is that cosmopolitanism can not free itself from an underlying culture and from certain values (even if they are ‘postnational’ or ‘constitutional’). And truly, identity can not be a completely void concept. ‘Civic culture’ is just another form - even though weaker - of (postnational) culture.
Conclusion
At the preliminary level to which it was intended, this essay invites to some optimism for the cosmopolitan position, as long as a few aspects are clarified: (i) the need of a certain civic culture; (ii) a precise definition of postnationality; and (iii) the importance of a pan-European public opinion arena.
(i) It is impossible to have (or create) a political identity with no culture at all. Even the most general civic values like ‘tolerance’ or ‘democracy’ possess a normative content. So the question would be rather what kind of culture. And the answer: a civic culture as open as possible to include all of the national traditions. This civic culture could have a first phase of formation in the ‘Charter’ of basic rights and thence evolve into a Constitution made with the participation of the largest possible majority of Europeans.
(ii) ‘Postnational’ should be distinguished from ‘anti-national’ and rather identified with ‘multi-national’, which agrees more accurately with the concept of cosmopolitanism: the conviction that, regardless of the sometimes significant differences between diverse peoples and nations, they all have a common (universal[46]) human background that can give way to understanding and cooperation, departing from a mutual will to dialog in a human (rational) manner[47].
(iii) A cosmopolitan arena, therefore, should work not as a melting pot[48], but as a common place for the expression of the different cultural and national traditions, including their history, religion, language, philosophy, literature, and so on. In a civic society, no national tradition could be persecuted or silenced. As long as every group respected the basic principles of life together, and translated the demands derived from their particular worldview into a language understandable to all, their contribution should be appreciated and included in the making of the cosmopolitan state. Aspects like solidarity cannot be mandated constitutionally and yet are essential for the performance of any State. They could come from those national culture traditions and worldviews.
Excursus: Cosmopolitanism and political identity in Australia
It was said before that, if the 'postnational'[49] or cosmopolitan position were to be the way to provide the EU with a political identity, an obvious first conclusion would be that such an identity is not (exclusively) European. Thence it might be used as a political glue to create a sense of belonging and civically bind together other multinational entities as well.
Actually, a cosmopolitan identity might already be at work, probably at a lower –but not less real – scale, in societies like Canada and Australia[50]. Today, Australians are ethnically 92% European and 7% Asian[51], and religiously 67% Christian, 2% Buddhist and 1.5% Muslim[52]. Nevertheless, the tendency points towards population growth with increased diversity[53]. Australia has up to now mainly benefited from multiculturalism, but in the future it will face the challenge of how to successfully integrate the different minorities, while respecting and valuing their diversity, promoting tolerance and understanding, and creating or renewing a political identity to make the State viable.
This research could offer useful insights for political integration also in Australia. On the one hand, it could investigate up to what extent Australia constitutes an 'early case' of cosmopolitanism ‘hidden’ in a nation State (which might already be a 'postnational state', though not formally). Some lessons could be drawn from the Australian case for the EU's attempt, which would be larger in quantity - but alike in quality. On the other hand, the research on cosmopolitanism for the EU’s case, might be applied to Australia and help it deal with challenges that it will face in the near future. A few of those are already present[54], and if dealt with successfully, they can open the way to an ever stronger and culturally richer cosmopolitan Australian society. Success in the face of these challenges is of decisive importance to Australia if it wants to play a protagonic role in the Pacific[55], as an element of dialog, understanding, cooperation, prosperity and peace in the region, and as a possible help in construction of a supranational, regional alliance[56].
[1] There is a ‘European Coal and Steel Community’ established by the Treaty of Paris signed on the 18 April 1951, and a ‘European Economic Community’ after the Treaty of Rome signed on the 25 March 1957. Retrieved 4 February 2009 from http://europa.eu/abc/history/1945-1959/index_es.htm
[2] Consider the ‘European Movement’ formed in October 1948, with Léon Blum, Winston Churchill, Alcide De Gasperi, Paul-Henri Spaak, Robert Schuman, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi and Konrad Adenauer as first honorary presidents. Its political scope was evident for example in its ‘Declaration European Politics’ made in Bruxelles in February 1949. In paragraph number 7 there is a clear mention of a ‘European Union’. Available at: http://www.ena.lu/ (accessed 3 February 2009).
[3] For example the ethnic, linguistic, religious, historic, literary, philosophical or artistic tradition appertaining to a certain group who typically form a nation.
[4] For example in Metaphysics, Book IV, Chapter 3 (1005 b) and Book V, Chapter 9 (1017b-1018a). Though Parmenides (the morning and the evening star, referring to Venus, see Diogenes Laertius, The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, Book IX) and Plato (Symposium, 207d-208b) seem to have dealt with the topic as well.
[5] Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/search/searcher.py?query=identity and http://www.answers.com/topic/identity (accessed 4 February 2009).
[6] Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/citizenship/ (accessed 4 February 2009).
[8] Some might argue that the votes where an internal reaction of those countries to their leaders, with whom they were unsatisfied. Yet the fact remains that if they perceived the EU deeply as their own, they would not have voted against its advancement.
[9] Famous statement at the beginning of the Treaty of Rome, 1957, establishing the European Community. See: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm#founding
[11] Here is an example on how the map varies greatly towards the east: in this map http://www.infoplease.com/atlas/europe.html that coincides with that of the Council of Europe (http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/About_Coe/Member_states/default.asp), some countries are included (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) which are left out in other maps of Europe: the UN classification of ‘Western Asia’ contains, among others, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/maplib/worldregions.htm), the same than the Worldwide NGO Directory (http://www.wango.org/resources.aspx?section=ngodir⊂=region®ionID=145&col=51ae63).
[13] Available at: http://www.europeanspirit.gr/biblioteca/havel_europe.html and http://www.europa-web.de/europa/02wwswww/203chart/chart_gb.htm (accessed 4 February 2009).
[14] See f.e. Wolfgang Schmale, in his article 'A history of European identity'. Available at http://www.eurotopics.net/en/magazin/geschichte-verteilerseite-neu/europaeische_nationalgeschichten_2008_05/apuz_schmale_eu_identiaet/1 (accessed 4 February 2009).
[15] See Anthony Giddens, 'Europe in the Global Age', Polity Press, Cambridge, 2007, pp. 216-222.
[16] That of Cosmopolitanism.
[17] Because it still presupposes that there is something exclusively European that gives identity to the region.
[18] Available at: http://europa.eu/abc/panorama/index_en.htm (accessed 5 February 2009).
[19] Available at: http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/about_coe/ (accessed 3 February 2009).
[20] With the exception of Moldova, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine.
[21] To do justice to the EU, it does think of countries like Azerbaijan and Armenia as part of Europe. See: http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/others/index_en.htm. The only difference between the two organisms in the conception of Europe seems to be Kosovo, mentioned on the EU site as a country (http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/others/kosovo/index_en.htm).
[22] See for example: http://www.solarnavigator.net/geography/europe.htm
[23] The topic is not new, and it served as the motive for the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean as recently as the middle of 2008 (http://www.ue2008.fr/PFUE/lang/fr/accueil/PFUE-07_2008/PFUE-13.07.2008/sommet_de_paris_pour_la_mediterranee_4758?=/PFUE/lang/fr/accueil/PFUE-07_2008/PFUE-13.07.2008/sommet_de_paris_pour_la_mediterranee_4758&x=4&y=14).
[24] Retrieved 1st February 2009http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnic_groups_of_Europe
[25] 15% of 800 million is still 120 million people, more than the population of Mexico.
[27] Another case of nation without country.
[28] ‘West’ is a most interesting, Euro-centric, term, which roughly refers to the West(ern) part of Europe (sometimes the westernmost countries of Europe – Spain and Portugal – are left aside as ‘Southern Europe’) and what has to do with it. Some countries, situated far to the east (of Europe) belong to ‘the West’, like New Zealand. And as west from Europe could be United States than Cuba (but not both would be listed as ‘Western’). But the need of a name that grouped the (Western) European way of thought and life, and that didn’t offend anyone not physically located in the European Continent, made way for the term ‘West’.
[29] If as a reference is taken the reign of Gaius Flavius Valerius Aurelius Constantinus (324-337). Just for purposes of illustration. Retrieved 1st February 2009 from http://www.humanitiesweb.org/human.php?s=h&p=c&a=i&ID=41
[30] See http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3450051.html and http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/europeanInstitute/articles/madeley2a.pdf, accessed 1st February 2009.
[31] Especially from the XV to the XVIII centuries.
[32] According to the Eurobarometer 2005, 33% of French, 30% of Czechs, 25% of Belgians and Dutch, 26% of Estonians and 25% of Germans, for example (retrieved 1 February 2009 from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_225_report_en.pdf).
[33] See data from: http://islamineurope.blogspot.com/2007/05/number-of-muslims-in-europe.html, http://www.islamicpopulation.com/europe_islam.html If, as the Council of Europe says, 800 million is the number of Europeans, the percentage should be 6.25%
[34] Retrieved 2 February 2009 from http://www.iht.com/articles/1995/06/26/buddha.php, http://thedhamma.com/buddhists_in_the_world.htm
[35] Retrieved 2 February 2009 from http://islamicweb.com/index.asp?folder=begin&file=population
[36] In fact, though few people would admit to talk officially in these terms, it remains a big challenge for the EU to deal with the candidacy of countries with a strong Muslim component in their culture.
[37] Mainly between the XVI and the XIX centuries.
[38] See a good explanation of these mixed motivations in Paul Johnson’s A History of Christianity, Chapter VII: ‘Almost Chosen Peoples’. Spanish translation by Aníbal Leal and Fernando Mateo. Javier Vergara Editors. Barcelona, 2005. pp. 531 ss.
[39] Among which is noticeable Jürgen Habermas, for example.
[40] Think for example at the national epic poems following the form of the Latin Aeneid: Os Lusíadas in Portugal, Beowulf in England, La Chanson de Roland in France, Nibelungenleid in Germany, the Cantar de Mío Cid in Spain or the Divina comedia in Italy. These and similar works did not only provide the new nation with a certain identity and common heroes, but some times even contributed as well to cement a regional dialect as the ‘national’ language (Tuscan in Italy, Castilian in Spain). In Philosophy good examples are Rousseau in France and Hegel in Germany. In music, Verdi in Italy and Wagner in Germany.
[41] Habermas, Jürgen. The Postnational Constellation. Political Essays. Translated by Max Pensky. The MIT Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2001. p. 89.
[42] See, for example, the Global citizens Movement, at http://www.eoearth.org/article/Global_citizens_movement, retrieved 2 February 2009.
[43] Habermas, ibidem, pp. 98-103.
[44] Hungtington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Simon & Schuster. Paperback edition. New York, 2003. The same author expresses all the anguish of nationalist (‘melting pot’) approaches when he deals with the multicultural situation of his country, United States of America: Who Are We. The Challenges to America’s National Identity. Simon & Schuster. New York, 2004.
[45] Giddens, Anthony. Europe in the Global Age. Polity Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 220.
[46] ‘Universal’ can be a very strong word nowadays, due to its absolutist connotation, not completely alien to colonialism and other forms of nationalism. Yet in a different sense, it serves to explain the basis for egalitarianism – the conviction that everybody, regardless of their ethno-linguistic, religious, geographical or cultural background, possesses an equal, basic and unquestionable human dignity (see: http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm, accessed 4 February 2009).
[47] In this task, philosophy understood as the sapiential richness of humanity in its different traditions (‘Eastern’, ‘Western’ and others) might play a key role. This seems to be the motivation for UNESCO to promote philosophy (Retrieved 4 February 2009 from: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=7760&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html).
[48] Retrieved 3 February 2009 from: http://europa.eu/languages/en/chapter/5
[49] One possible question could be if the odd term 'post national' might not be just another way to term a federation or confederation. Arguably it is different. For starters, a postnational entity might include several nations either larger or smaller than a 'state'.
[50] The case of USA might be different, since here, at least traditionally, there is a strong tendency towards a society as a 'melting pot' (see footnote number 44). Arguably Canada and Australia might have much more open, inclusive societies, which not only tolerate but also value diversity. It would be interesting as well to study under the same light the case of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, which at first glance would seem to be much more on the cosmopolitan side.
[51] Retrieved 5 February 2009 from: http://www.indexmundi.com/australia/ethnic_groups.html
[52] Retrieved 5 February 2009 from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/as.html
[53] By 2050 today’s population of 21 million could have doubled already. Retrieved 5 February 2009 from: http://www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/3222.0
[54] These may include for example possible terrorist attacks from Muslim groups or violence from European background (white) Australians against minorities from, say, the Middle East (see: http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,178522,00.html, accessed 4 February 2009).
[55] The Australian proposal seems to have in mind the EU as a model (see: http://www.voanews.com/english/2008-11-21-voa20.cfm, accessed 3 February 2009).
[56] Retrieved 4 February 2009 from: http://www.theage.com.au/national/rudds-grand-vision-for-asiapacific-20080604-2lw1.html
